viernes, 31 de enero de 2020

Usos para el CO2

Un tema muy importante para la transición energética: La captura y secuestro o uso de carbono seguramente sólo tenga sentido si no hace falta secuestrar (por las implicaciones sobre seguridad y espacio), y si en su lugar reutilizamos el CO2 capturado. Eso sí, esta reutilización, para que de verdad tenga efectos sobre la concentración de CO2 en la atmósfera, debe ser en usos perdurables (no por ejemplo para fabricar combustibles sintéticos). Cameron Hepburn nos plantea unos cuantos que pueden tener sentido y otros que no tanto salvo que hagamos más cosas: como bien dice en la categoría 3, el CO2 para combustibles debe ser capturado del aire para que realmente pueda ser considerado neutro; y su punto 5 es bastante discutible. En todo caso, interesante.

ADD: Aquí está el paper de Nature en el que está basado el artículo.

jueves, 30 de enero de 2020

miércoles, 29 de enero de 2020

Otra forma de descarbonizar el cemento: dejar de usarlo

Pero claro, para eso hacen falta alternativas...aquí va una que ha generado recientemente bastante atracción en la web, y que no tiene mala pinta (aunque sigue sin ser tan resistente como el hormigón armado).

martes, 28 de enero de 2020

Atributos esenciales para los políticos de la energía

Nick Butler los propone para el Reino Unido, pero yo creo que son igual de aplicables para España:

  • A world view that reminds them that eliminating all UK emissions will not solve the global problem. 
  • The political sense to see that the public support for necessary changes will evaporate if they impose ever greater costs on energy users while leaving the global problem unresolved. 
  • The ability to face down an army of lobbyists seeking to shape the system in the interest of their clients. 
  • Specific knowledge of the continuing technical revolution in the energy business. This has reduced costs and now offers possibilities for a transition to a lower carbon economy not just in the developed world but also in the emerging economies where the real challenge of the next few decades lies. 
A mí me parece particularmente importante el tercero, aunque Butler subraya esto no debe suponer sacar a las empresas de la mesa de negociación.

lunes, 27 de enero de 2020

Una propuesta sensata de cheque verde

Juan Francisco Jimeno propone el cheque verde como política sensata para luchar simultáneamente contra el estancamiento, las emisiones, y la desigualdad. Y la cosa tiene sentido, claro:
Hay otra manera de proporcionar estímulos fiscales y reducir las emisiones de CO2 con una medida que, además, disminuiría la desigualdad de renta. Se trata de combinar un impuesto global sobre las emisiones de CO2 con un programa de transferencias directas a los ciudadanos que les devolviera los recursos necesarios para inversiones en transición energética como, por ejemplo, la rehabilitación de edificios, la implantación de energías renovables o la renovación de automóviles por otros menos contaminantes (de forma parecida a lo que hemos propuesto para la implementación de las políticas supranacionales de empleo). Estas transferencias, además de compensar a los ciudadanos por el coste de la imposición, tendrían efectos positivos sobre la actividad económica al tratarse de inversiones muy intensivas en mano de obra, especialmente necesarias en un momento de desaceleración económica. Y siendo de una cantidad igual para todos los hogares (y mediante un cheque transferible entre ellos) tendría un fuerte carácter progresivo.
En términos macro, esto seguramente funcione, como ya han demostrado los estudios de Xaquín y Mikel, o los nuestros. La gran pregunta es si las familias harían estas inversiones en rehabilitación o renovación simplemente por recibir este cheque. Seguramente, como menciona Jimeno, habría que condicionar la recepción a estas inversiones...pero esto hace la medida mucho más compleja. Una idea sería complementar esto con medidas de financiación que, junto con el cheque, hagan posible que las familias se gasten el dinero en esto y no en otras cosas...

viernes, 24 de enero de 2020

Ocho reglas de vida

Me han parecido muy sensatas, la verdad...Para darle vueltas el fin de semana.

Las limitaciones de los meta-análisis

Los meta-análisis se han puesto relativamente de moda en la literatura científica: son una forma interesante de agregar conocimiento, y de extractar información útil para la aplicación de la evidencia. Sin embargo, tienen un riesgo, y es que, si la literatura subyacente tiene sesgos (de publicación, o de cherry-picking), entonces el meta-análisis lo único que hace es amplificar este sesgo. Y el problema es que, por definición, no es posible contrarrestar este sesgo en el propio meta-análisis. Hace falta comparar de otra forma, como hacen Kvarven et al. (gracias a Tyler Cowen por la pista). Lo malo es que encuentran que los resultados de los meta-análisis son tres veces mayores de lo razonable, y que no hay formas sencillas de eliminar este sesgo...Por tanto, precaución.

jueves, 23 de enero de 2020

Los costes del cierre nuclear en Alemania

Un paper reciente (gracias a Alex Tabarrok por la pista) concluye que el coste del cierre nuclear en Alemania fue de 12.000 millones de dólares al año, cuando se tienen en cuenta los costes de la contaminación atmosférica. El coste externo de las emisiones de CO2 (a 50€/t) es de 1.800 mill/año, mientras que el aumento de un 12% de las emisiones de SO2, NOx y partículas supone 8.900 mill/año. Haciendo una agregación burda de las 40kt de aumento, esto equivale a 222.000 $/t de coste externo, un orden de magnitud por encima de las valoraciones habituales, algo que fundamentalmente viene de su supuesto de valoración de la vida estadística: 7,9 millones de dólares cada una. En cambio, su valoración de los costes externos de la nuclear es relativamente modesta: su número central es de 3 $/MWh, lo que supone 200 millones al año.

Si bajamos la estimación del coste externo de la tonelada de contaminante a 20.000 $/t, entonces nos pondríamos en unos 900 millones. Y si subimos el coste externo de la nuclear a 30, el coste-beneficio en términos de contaminación atmosférica se invierte, aunque no llega a compensar los costes económicos y de CO2. Pero curiosamente, en su sección sobre Robustness checks no llegan a bajar tanto la valoración de la vida, con lo que mantienen los términos del coste-beneficio.

Como recordaréis, nosotros evaluamos los impactos del cierre nuclear en España desde el punto de vista de los costes y las emisiones de CO2, pero sin computar el impacto sobre las emisiones atmosféricas, algo que es el punto central en el análisis de Jarvis et al. Además también éramos más optimistas en cuanto a la sustitución de la nuclear por renovables en lugar de carbón y lignito, algo que tiene que ver fundamentalmente con los plazos del abandono. En todo caso, los órdenes de magnitud de los costes económicos y de emisiones son similares a los nuestros.

La conclusión, en cualquier caso, es que el cierre nuclear tiene un cierto coste, y que parece que, al menos en Alemania y en España, la sociedad está dispuesta a asumirlo, si nos guiamos por las decisiones políticas adoptadas...Otra cuestión es cuál es ese coste realmente, y si lo conocemos bien.

miércoles, 22 de enero de 2020

La amenaza del aire acondicionado

Amenaza en términos energéticos y climáticos, siempre que, claro, no seamos capaces de descarbonizar totalmente la energía necesaria para ello.

Lucas Davis et al estiman el incremento potencial de la demanda de aire acondicionado, y concluyen que es enorme. Aunque, en mi opinión, se dejan fuera dos cuestiones importantes: una, el impacto de las técnicas constructivas, que podrían hacer (en el caso por ejemplo de la arquitectura tradicional) que un mismo nivel de CDDs no se traduzca a la misma necesidad de aire acondicionado; dos, el calentamiento global, que hará que los CDDs aumenten. Estas dos cuestiones podrían compensarse entre sí, o no. Muy interesante en cualquier caso esta primera aproximación.

martes, 21 de enero de 2020

Los efectos negativos de la tecnología en las aulas

En el MIT Tech Review nos cuentan cómo la tecnología en las aulas no sólo no ayuda, sino que además puede resultar incluso peor para los estudiantes más vulnerables.

Y es que, como en todo, la tecnología es un medio, no un fin. Y si se utiliza mal, dará malos resultados. Por eso muchas veces me he cuestionado si tanta inversión en pizarras digitales y demás zarandajas tecnológicas no es realmente más que "greenwash" tecnológico, excusas para que nos creamos que nos estamos adaptando a las nuevas generaciones...cuando lo que de verdad necesitamos es innovación metodológica: menos lecciones magistrales, con pizarra o sin ella, más motivación para el trabajo autónomo fuera del aula, más resolución de problemas reales...Este párrafo del artículo es central:
So what role does Berger see for ed tech? Rather than asking “What are the parts of education that a computer can do instead of a human?” he thinks the question should be “What are teachers trying to do, and how do we help them do those things?” That means giving them a better understanding of what’s going on in the classroom, saving them time, and enabling them “to reach more kids directly more often.”
Más preocupante aún, la "flipped classroom", que en mi opinión es una de las metodologías más interesantes, puede abrir la brecha entre estudiantes, ya que parece que no es capaz de ayudar a todos. Y si sólo ayuda a los buenos...no está respondiendo al verdadero trabajo del profesor, que es ayudar al que de verdad lo necesita.

Vale la pena leer el artículo con calma.

lunes, 20 de enero de 2020

El mensaje de año nuevo de Karsten Neuhoff y su visión de la política climática para 2020

 De mi buzón de correo:

Happy new year from the Climate Policy Department at DIW Berlin!

Allow me to share some of our analysis that may be relevant for the 2020 policy discussion based on the following three developments in 2019.

•        Carbon neutrality is widely seen to be necessary, technologically feasible, macro-economically viable and can help to achieve multiple sustainable development goals.
•        Carbon neutrality provides clarity for the political discourse on the future of electricity, transport, industry and housing. It thus allows mainstream political parties to debate tangible, long-term transition strategies.
•        Improving governance structures for climate policy and sustainable finance enhances the ability of governments to implement effective policy frameworks and for firms to invest.
With a clearly defined and easy to understand climate neutrality objective, with stronger anchoring in our societies, and with a good governance framework in place, in Germany and Europe much of 2020 will be dedicated to improving policy implementation. The focus on carbon neutrality can also help to clarify pathways and emission targets for 2025 and 2030 in the run-up to the COP 26 in Glasgow.

Let me illustrate this based on some of our analysis for the (i) industrial sector (ii) power sector (iii) governance structures for climate policy and sustainable finance.

(i) The Industry Sector

The production of basic materials like steel, cement or plastics is responsible for a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions. Climate neutrality can be reached with a combination of new climate friendly production processes and materials and significantly more resource efficiency and recycling. So what policies can unlock these mitigation opportunities?

Carbon pricing is obviously an important element. Economists have long argued for the internalization of externalities, but usually focused on incentives for efficiency improvement of production. However, this is insufficient, as we show in a
review of empirical evidence and economic theory with Robert Ritz. Due to international trade of products and free allocation of emission allowances, carbon cost pass-through is limited. The industry and construction sectors do therefore not internalize carbon costs in their choices on resource efficiency and material substitution. With limited carbon cost pass-through, material producers also struggle to see a business case for break-through technologies with incremental costs and hesitate to invest.

Full carbon cost internalization should be an essential objective of a policy package. As part of the European Green Deal, the EU Commission is considering a carbon border-adjustment mechanism to strengthen the carbon price incentive while avoiding carbon leakage risks. To create relevant incentives for investors, such a
mechanism needs to be robust for the long-term, e.g. also beyond the tenure of the current US government. Proposals purely focusing on the production site face a dilemma. Design elements that make a mechanism robust to WTO challenges, e.g. limiting coverage to imports, reduce the effectiveness in creating incentives towards carbon neutrality.

The dilemma can be resolved by complementing the EU ETS with a climate contribution, e.g. a charge on the final sale of basic materials like steel, cement-clinker or plastic. It is set at the same benchmark used for free allowances allocation and thus reinstates the full carbon cost internalization. With the introduction, free allowance allocation is reformed as well and
directly linked to production volumes. This avoids windfall profits and enhances carbon leakage protection. We have complemented analysis on legal, micro-economic, and administrative aspects with a model-based assessment of the positive macro-economic implications. Governments and basic material producers in several EU member states are now discussing the climate contribution as a pragmatic option to achieve the policy objectives of the carbon border-adjustment mechanism.
Obviously, also the carbon price level and uncertainty matter for investment incentives.
Jörn Richstein has analyzed how national governments can offer Carbon Contracts for Difference for innovative low-carbon production processes and materials. They can create incentives exceeding current carbon price levels, and hedge companies against market and regulatory risk. As a result, financing costs and the need for innovation funding decline. Discussions at member state and EU level are ongoing, and involve also funding through the climate contribution as well as opportunities for EU guidance documents to facilitate early harmonization.

Large-scale material efficiency and substitution to low-carbon alternatives can require a lot of coordination. It extends from the definition of product requirements, design and material choices to qualification and certification of participating firms. Olga Chiappinelli analyses the scale of public purchasing activities, and
reviews the experience of national and local governments using green public procurement. Considering green criteria can reduce public authorities’ carbon footprints and create lead markets for climate-friendly product design, material choice and usage patterns.

While these policies are essential to build up new technologies, practices and business models, I am not certain that on their own they will be strong enough to phase out carbon-intensive production processes. Hence, together with Alice Pirlot, Manuel Haussner and Timo Gerres we
assess administrative and WTO review experience and find that any government can implement product carbon requirements which effectively ban the sale of carbon-intensive materials in their territory for all products. Obviously, product carbon requirements are only feasible once a sufficient share of climate friendly materials are available post 2030. However, their anticipation is already relevant for today’s corporate strategy. Climate-friendly production processes and materials are no longer “nice to have” but essential to secure the “license to operate”.
We have developed this policy package with the
Climate Friendly Materials (CFM) Platform in cooperation with IDDRI (France), WiseEuropa (Poland), IVL( Sweden), IIT Comillas (Spain), as well as Radboud University Nijmegen (Netherlands), REKK (Hungary), Vrije Universiteit Brüssel (Belgium) and published it as "Building blocks for a climate-neutral European industrial sector" to inform the debate on the EU’s European Green Deal with scientific input and EU member state perspectives. These policies are good for an inclusive transformation that allows all countries to take part and also offer much needed clarity welcomed by industry.

(ii) The power sector

Carbon neutrality does require further increases of the deployment of wind and solar power. To enhance public acceptance for onshore wind power, the federal German government argued for generic requirements on the minimum distances of wind turbines to nearby residential areas.
Evaluating state-level experience, Jan Stede and Nils May show that the resulting reduced land that is available translates into a drastic reduction of the deployment of wind power. Moreover, there is no evidence that stricter minimum distance regulation significantly increases public acceptance of wind power. One reason is that regulation protecting residents from the site-specific noise and shadow emissions of wind turbines is already in place in Germany. Luckily, after a heated debate the German government refrained from implementing general minimum distance regulations for the time being. 2020 will show if policy makers will advance more promising alternative approaches. National and international experience shows that mandatory payments from project developers to the respective municipalities can facilitate this and increase acceptance.

The need of renewable power for carbon-neutral industrial production processes starts to focus the attention of industry and hence also policy makers on ensuring large-scale availability of wind and solar projects at low financing costs. While private power purchasing agreements (PPAs) have gained much public attention in 2019,
our analysis with Nils May suggests that they can increase levelized cost of electricity from wind and solar projects by up to 30% due to regulatory uncertainty and incomplete markets. Publicly-backed contracts for difference for renewables avoid such cost increases, enable competition between sites and can render climate neutrality viable.

To use wind and solar power effectively, flexibility across the power sector will be essential. It requires more storage, stronger grids, and especially unlocking of demand side flexibility. Jörn Richstein, Jan Stede and Saeed Hosseinioun analyzed how to unlock demand side flexibility in basic materials processes like cement production via suitable regulatory frameworks
and the role of aggregation in enabling demand response. Multi-part bids in intraday auctions could for example lead to a better integration of demand response. Together with the European research, industry and policy partners in the Future Power Markets Platform, we furthermore explored potential developments of forward markets to support the changing generation mix and investments in particular in demand side flexibility. These are just two steps in the gradual improvement of German and EU power market designs towards further efficiency improvements and EU integration.

(iii) Governance structure for policy and sustainable finance

Reflecting on the last decade, it is fascinating to see for how long we have tried in Germany to implement climate policy without breaking down targets and responsibilities to ministries responsible for transport, buildings, industry, agriculture or energy. Can you imagine what would have happened with a similar approach in the private sector? What would have been the fate of a private firm that tells each employee to maximize overall shareholder value without offering further guidance? Obviously, at least annual indicators and targets are defined for every business unit and team.

A lack of clearly defined and allocated responsibilities may well be the reason that
Jan Stede and Puja Singhal find “a lost decade” for the buildings sector. Temperature-adjusted heating energy demand in German multi-family homes has consistently increased since 2015. In 2018, it was higher than in 2010. For the buildings analyzed in the Heat Monitor, retrofit activity was low: Less than 1% of the buildings surface is typically retrofitted per year. This is only a fraction of the retrofit rate that was achieved in the 1990s in East Germany.
Given this experience, the biggest progress on German Climate Policy in 2019 was probably the Climate Change Law defining emission pathways for sectors, allocating the responsibility for these targets to line ministries, improving reporting, and establishing an annual climate change cabinet meeting to align objectives across sectors. It was great to see these elements implemented.
In our analysis, we had identified two further components that deserve attention in 2020.

First, policies may only show real emission impact with delays of several years, for example after the realization of infrastructure projects. Therefore, not only timely reporting of realized emissions, but even more important, emission projection reports by an independent institution are important. They can allow the public to assess measures implemented by the current government and therefore praise ministers that implement effective climate policies. It is therefore important to measure and define progress along key indicators for the transformation to climate neutrality – e.g. based on the share of climate friendly material production, the depth of thermal retrofit, or the scale of electricity storage capacity realized.

Second, the finance sector can accelerate the low-carbon transition by monitoring the exposure of the real economy to so-called transition risk. This is the risk for a project or firm, if governments suddenly strengthen climate policies. It can involve write-offs of assets values (e.g. of coal power stations), losses of market shares and profitability (e.g. for cars with combustion engines), or risk the entire operation of a company for example if it cannot secure clean input factors to serve markets that implement product carbon requirements (e.g. through green public procurement). Following Carney’s call for attention, countries like the UK, France and the Netherlands had already therefore improved climate-reporting for listed companies and investors.

The outgoing EU commission had therefore prioritized sustainable finance. In particular the proposed taxonomy for sustainable investments to guide the reporting by firms was heavily discussed. It is based not only on aggregated emissions of firms, but also looks at the emission performance of major activities like steel production. To enhance the input from the scientific side to the national and EU process, together with Frankfurt School of Finance and the Universities of Augsburg, Kassel and Hamburg we set up the
German Sustainable Finance Research Platform. With platform partners, Franziska Schütze coordinated a critical review of the taxonomy outlining improvement perspectives and Ingmar Jürgens co-authored with our partners a policy brief synthesizing the evidence base on mandatory corporate emission reporting. It shows that mandatory reporting creates incentives for companies to reduce emissions. The adoption of the taxonomy at the end if 2019 is only a first step, review provisions and a standing committee create opportunities for further improvements.

In 2019, the German Government declared the ambition to become one of the leading sustainable finance market places, and established a sustainable finance advisory group with its first full report planned for 2020. While not the first such group, its distinctive feature is the participation of real-economy firms. I think it will be particularly interesting to explore how the new clarity on carbon neutrality will be reflected in reporting structures to inform investors in achieving a positive climate impact and financial institutions and regulators in testing for financial stability. As Sustainable Finance Research Platform, we are contributing to all working groups of the advisory board.

From a global perspective, 2019 ended without an agreement on the rulebook of the COP in Madrid, which illustrates the discrepancy between the top-down vision of the Kyoto Protocol and the bottom-up vision of the Paris Agreement. The Kyoto vision is based on an agreement of emission (reduction) targets for countries. Countries can trade allowances to balance surplus and shortage, and have incentives to achieve targets to reduce costs of buying allowances. The COP in Copenhagen, however, showed that this framework does not motivate countries to commit to ambitious emission reduction targets. Why would countries commit to ambitious targets, if they subsequently have to pay large sums to buy surplus emissions from countries with less ambitious commitments?

Hence, the Paris Agreement vision of climate cooperation focuses on national commitments towards a low-carbon transition, which are iteratively strengthened. In article 9, richer countries commit 100 billion per year to support climate action in poorer countries. In principle, the Paris vision does not comprise international trading. In political practice, several actors wanted to retain trading opportunities and hence the Paris agreement also comprises an article on international trading. The debates at the Madrid COP were all about the precise rules for this article 6. Discussions will now continue on what rules for international carbon trading could secure environmental integrity? Will the potential benefits of such trading justify the additional complexity it creates for national international climate action?

What is probably just as important is a more precise characterization and broader understanding of Article 9. How can USD 100 billion of climate finance support domestic policy makers in the further development and implementation of nationally determined contributions (NDC)? How can this help to achieve a just and Paris compatible transition? How to structure the funding to help developing countries to manage the transition risks and leapfrog directly to advanced climate neutral technologies? We just started a four-year
project as part of the German international climate initiative together with Teri in India, UCT in South Africa, FGV in Brazil, the CCCITB in Indonesia, as well as New Climate Institute, Vivid economics and IKEM, to contribute to the evidence base on these questions and feed it back to the political discourse.

Let me conclude with thanking the funding our department received from German Ministries for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWI), Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) and Education and Research (BMBF), the EU Commission, the OECD and the foundations Mercator, Mistra, and ECF. But most of all, I would like to thank all of you for inspiring conversations and constructive cooperation. Let’s continue to work together in 2020 to accompany the implementation of an effective climate policy framework.

In this spirit – best wishes for 2020 on behalf of the entire department,

Karsten Neuhoff

viernes, 17 de enero de 2020

Global visions about the energy transition

The most recent issue of Papeles de Energia, featuring visions of the global energy transition from Vaclav Smil, Spencer Dale & Jorge Blázquez (BP), and Seb Henbest (BNEF), is now available online.

This journal was born in 2016 with the objective of contributing, from independent scientific knowledge, to the necessary debate about the global, European, and Spanish energy transition. As I mentioned in the introduction to the first issue, global energy systems face several challenges and opportunities in their evolution towards more sustainable and robust systems, and it is essential to reach a political and social consensus that will facilitate the investments and actions required, with a long-term vision. And a fundamental element for this consensus is rigorous and independent analysis from different perspectives.

In the seven issues published along these four years, major international researchers have been covering both general issues about the transition and particular aspects, such as the role of demand or business models, competition or innovation policies, the design of electricity markets, or the aspects associated to a just transition.

In this issue we return to the first topic, presenting the vision of three of the most renowned international experts on global energy transitions. As may be easily seen, these experts do not necessarily share their views, something not really surprising given the difficulty in predicting the future…although it is possible to extract a common message from their analysis, a message that, in my opinion, allows us to move towards this sustainable future desired by all.

In the first paper, Vaclav Smil, Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of Manitoba, and probably the best known analyst of the evolution of the use of energy throughout history, as shown in his many books, makes use of his ever-present critical spirit and reminds us that the public discourse about energy transitions has focused too much on the electricity sector and on the electrification of transport, has forgotten about the industrial transition, has not accounted enough for the history of past energy transitions, and is, in general, excessively optimistic. In his paper he focuses on what he calls six fundamental realities: there is nothing new about energy transitions, which have taken place since the beginning of civilization; the current transition is unprecedented in terms of the desired speed, of the scale required, and of the use of variable and low-density energy sources; the decarbonization of the global energy supply is not being driven by energy prices or fuel scarcity, or by security of supply; even modest reductions in emissions will be very difficult; global civilization will be dependent on fossil fuels for a long time, and therefore any statement that decarbonization may be achieved in two or three decades  is unrealistic and irresponsible; and finally, decarbonization includes some relatively simple transitions, but also others for which we do not have answers currently.

His conclusion, initially negative, is that this transition will share attributes of past ones: it will be gradual, intergenerational, and with different progress rates by region. However, he also ends with a positive note: engaging more strongly in innovation and energy efficiency can speed up this transition.

In the following paper, Jorge Blázquez and Spencer Dale, lead and chief economists respectively at the BP group, present the main questions and uncertainties related to the energy transition. Blázquez and Dale have a clear view that the energy mix in 2040 will be very different to the current one; that energy demand will continue growing in developing countries; and that we must reduce greenhouse gas emissions as quickly as possible. But this is where certainty ends: neither the speed of this transformation, or the role of the different technologies, or its share among sectors, are clear. Their Evolving Transition scenario tries to identify the key issues affecting the energy transition, in particular how much energy will the world require, how important are plastics for oil demand, how fast can renewable energy grow, and what else do we need to ensure a quick transition toward a decarbonized system.

Their (summarized) answers are: energy demand will grow 30% by 2040, driven by the increased prosperity of developing countries, mostly in Asia, something that clearly makes it more difficult to achieved the required reduction in emissions; growing trade disputes may reduce global GDP growth, and with it energy demand, and also promote the use of domestic energy sources (including coal); regulations about the use of plastics may affect significantly oil demand; renewables are growing much faster than other energy sources in the past, but may be slowed by the capital intensity required, and may not grow enough to reach climate targets. The consequence of all this is that this scenario is not consistent with the Paris Agreement. Achieving it would require a much more rapid transition, which in turn will require a wide set of measures, combining carbon prices with other more specific policies, including in particular an unprecedented deployment of renewable energy. However, renewables will continue representing only a third of global energy supply (in primary energy terms), so other technologies will be needed to decarbonize the rest of the energy system, in particular hydrogen and carbon capture.

In a clear contrast, Seb Henbest, chief economist at Bloomberg New Energy Finance, seems to have a much clearer view, at least in the medium term. Henbest relies on the spectacular advances in the cost of photovoltaic and wind energy and of batteries to preview a future in which, by 2050, renewable power (photovoltaics and wind) will produce 80% of the electricity at the global level, something he calls Phase I of the energy transition. In addition, he remarks that these advances will be more important for the global energy matrix than what is generally shown by primary energy statistics, which don’t actually represent the real use of energy (which must be done in terms of final energy). Europe will clearly lead this process, but other regions must speed up renewable energy deployment if they want to achieve this level of penetration before 2050. In the US natural gas is more competitive and hence renewables do not progress that much. In China, India and Southeast Asia cheap coal is the major obstacle. However, a very important point in Henbest’s conclusion, shared by the three papers, is that reaching the climate target of 2ºC, or even 1.5ºC, is impossible if current trends are not changed radically.

Therefore, beyond the different views of the authors, there is a shared central message: achieving the targets included in the Paris Agreement will require additional, substantive measures to speed up the transition. To this extent, the different author’s proposals are not opposed but complementary. We will require, as Smil proposes, to step up our efforts on innovation and energy efficiency; also, as mentioned by Blázquez and Dale, to explore the options offered by hydrogen and carbon capture; and above all, as put forward by Henbest, to create a regulatory framework that may mobilize the large investments required to achieve the targets. As I said at the beginning, these complementary proposals should allow us to advance, from a shared position, towards a more sustainable energy model, from a good understanding of the current situation and the potential constraints, but also of the benefits of adopting ambitious but sensible policies.

As has been repeatedly expressed in the recent COP in Madrid, it is time to act, it is the time to move from target setting to political action. It is the moment in which governments and opposing parties must act responsibly and with a long-term vision, creating those efficient and fair regulatory frameworks that promote investments, and also innovation and energy efficiency. I hope that from Papeles de Energía we will continue offering independent and rigorous knowledge that informs these regulatory frameworks.

jueves, 16 de enero de 2020

Políticas efectivas para el transporte urbano

Dos ejemplos más de políticas que funcionan para reducir tráfico y contaminación en nuestras ciudades (algo bueno, a pesar de lo que digan algunas ignorantes recientemente), y en línea con lo que recomendábamos en el resumen del Foro BP reciente:

- Aumentar el coste de comprar un vehículo consigue reducciones muy importantes del parque, y también de la distancia recorrida y de la congestión (y por tanto, de la contaminación).
-  Y dar señales dinámicas del coste del aparcamiento consigue reducir la congestión y aumentar el uso del transporte público.

Desgraciadamente, ninguno de los trabajos mira cuestiones de equidad, algo también importante...pero creo que son contribuciones muy valiosas. A ver cuándo conseguimos evaluar igual de rigurosamente Madrid Central...

martes, 14 de enero de 2020

¿Cómo definir los "predatory journals"?

Parece que no hay consenso sobre cómo definirlos...algo que evidentemente hace más compleja la tarea de los evaluadores.

En todo caso, he de decir que a mí la definición que plantean como de consenso no me convence. Decir que se caracterizan por anteponer el interés financiero sobre el rigor académico no las hace demasiado distintas de las publicaciones tradicionales, cuyo feo modelo de negocio ya he comentado aquí otras veces. Para mí lo que caracteriza de verdad a estas revistas es la falta de calidad editorial, y por tanto, en general, de los artículos que se publican en ellas, algo que los autores dicen que era demasiado controvertido (no estoy de acuerdo, no hay más que ver por ejemplo lo rápido que se acepta una publicación tras ser enviada):
Most controversially, we omitted quality of peer review, even though negligent peer review is often a prominent feature of predatory journals. We are not saying that peer review is unimportant, only that it is currently impossible to assess. Unfortunately, many legitimate journals fail to make their peer-review processes sufficiently transparent, for instance by sharing peer reviewers’ comments and other data. At the moment, journal quality, adequacy of peer review and deceit are too subjective to include.
Y eso independientemente de que sean capaces de aparecer en los índices de impacto más prestigiosos: hay revistas de este tipo que ya están apareciendo en el Q2. Y, desgraciadamente, esto va a más, en parte por la permisividad de los financiadores para pagar artículos open-access en ellas (algo que no hace falta con los repositorios institucionales), y con también la permisividad de gestores académicos que animan a sus investigadores a publicar en ellas para salir en los rankings. Un desastre.

lunes, 13 de enero de 2020

viernes, 10 de enero de 2020

Descarbonización de la industria e hidrógeno

Los estadounidenses tienen un problema aún mayor que el nuestro con la descarbonización de la industria, ya que su peso en las emisiones totales es mayor (fundamentalmente por la industria petroquímica y de exploración de hidrocarburos). Así que es interesante ver qué opciones plantean para conseguirlo. En este informe nos cuentan que las claves son, al igual que en muchos otros ejercicios de prospectiva, el hidrógeno y la economía circular, que conseguirían entre las dos un 50% de la descarbonización requerida.

Sobre el hidrógeno, Dolf Gielen de IRENA (ex-IEA) nos resume su estado de desarrollo. Y aquí nos cuentan un piloto en el que han mezclado hasta un 20% de hidrógeno en una red de gas natural.

Sobre la economía circular, todavía estoy esperando un análisis serio, que muestre con rigor el impacto sobre la economía y el empleo de una reducción del uso y producción de materiales...


jueves, 9 de enero de 2020

Avances en lámina delgada fotovoltaica

La lámina delgada ha sido la gran promesa de la FV desde hace años, pero seguimos confiando en los módulos de siempre. En este artículo nos explican por qué, y plantean algunas posibilidades para la lámina delgada.

miércoles, 8 de enero de 2020

Regalo de Reyes: Modelo abierto de sector eléctrico

De mi buzón de correo, y elaborado por Andrés, Luis, Sara y Erik:

In the context of the European project openENTRANCE that aims at developing, using and disseminating an open, transparent and integrated modelling platform for assessing low-carbon transition pathways in Europe, we are committed to develop the Open Generation and Transmission Operation and Expansion Planning Model with RES and ESS (openTEPES). The model has been developed in Python/Pyomo and all the information, documentation and source code are available from this link. The motto of the development is providing Simplicity and Transparency in Power Systems Planning

martes, 7 de enero de 2020

Las cuentas de los Green Deals

Promoviéndose tanto en EEUU como en Europa, los "pactos verdes" o Green New Deal prometen descarbonizar las economías a la vez que generan oportunidades para el empleo. Sobre el papel, estos esquemas parecen estupendos, igual que también por ejemplo el PNIEC español, que plantea un análisis económico similar.

Pero la gran pregunta es cómo materializar estas oportunidades, y más en concreto, cómo lograr que las inversiones (enormes) necesarias se logren sin costes adicionales para la economía. En el caso del PNIEC, por ejemplo, el supuesto fundamental es que hay mucho dinero esperando las condiciones apropiadas para invertir, y que, una vez que se establezcan estas condiciones, el dinero vendrá, sin coste de oportunidad. En el caso del Green New Deal americano, la propuesta es utilizar la "Modern Monetary Theory", es decir, básicamente crear dinero sin que eso suponga inflación, algo que no está tan claro para algunos. En el caso europeo, aún no hay propuesta, aunque evidentemente aumentar el presupuesto comunitario puede generar bastantes fricciones.

En todo caso, creo que esta es la pregunta central cuya respuesta hay que tener muy clara antes de tratar de convencer a la gente de que se embarquen en estos proyectos. Porque sí, las oportunidades son muchas, pero si, como decía el otro día, al final la gente no percibe que se aprovechan, lo único que haremos será generar frustración y rechazo.

viernes, 3 de enero de 2020

Las previsiones de Michael Liebreich para esta década

En estas dos entradas, complementarias entre sí y también con una de mis últimas entradas del 2019, Michael Liebreich hace reflexiones muy valiosas en mi opinión sobre el proceso internacional contra el cambio climático, y sobre la evolución de las emisiones a futuro. Muy recomendables las dos.

Además, trufadas en el texto, hace un par de contribuciones muy oportunas sobre un par de cuestiones frecuentemente malinterpretadas.

- Una, sobre la "emergencia climática", no falsa, pero sí hábilmente utilizada por algunos para perseguir agendas particulares, y su origen en una malinterpretación del escenario tendencial del IPCC. Liebreich recuerda que el RCP8.5 no es creíble, y por tanto debería dejar de utilizarse para llamar a la acción, para no dar armas innecesarias a los negacionistas. El RCP4.5, aunque no sea catastrófico, es suficiente razón para actuar, primero, por ética (porque los más pobres sí van a sufrir mucho, incluso en este escenario), y segundo, por tratar de reducir la probabilidad de eventos extremos como los que estamos viviendo.

- Dos, sobre la sobrecapacidad renovable. Como bien explica Liebreich, en la línea de lo que ya he comentado yo otras veces, la sobrecapacidad es una cuestión económica, no técnica: no pasa nada por tener potencia instalada ociosa (Xavi Gª Casals ya lo suponía en su Renovables 2050) si el coste de inversión en renovables es lo suficientemente bajo. Lo mismo pasa con los vertidos: no pasa nada por verter electricidad renovable, si es más rentable hacerlo que forzar al sistema a incorporarlos.

jueves, 2 de enero de 2020

Feliz 2020!

Al fin llegó el famoso 2020, el de los objetivos 20-20-20 y similares que nos parecía tan lejos, al menos tanto como ahora 2050...Ojalá sea un buen año para todos, y en especial para los lectores del blog.

Y como otros años, para esta primera entrada del año os dejo unas cuantas lecturas curiosas:

- La visión futurista ultratecnológica de Frank Chen. Yo no termino de verla para 2030, y además, tampoco termina de gustarme...
- Y ahí va otra aún más rupturista aún, esta vez sobre agricultura y ganadería. Parece que, para muchos, 10 años son todo un mundo....y realmente no son nada....
- Ahora que entra el invierno (aunque los días comienzan a alargarse), a lo mejor hay que pensar trabajar menos horas en esta estación...para ser más productivos
- O a lo mejor, en lugar de trabajar menos, jubilarse directamente, como siempre nos recuerda Mr. Moustache :)

Feliz 2020 para todos.