Muy interesante de leer. Y aunque habla de prevenir el crimen, creo que sus razonamientos se pueden aplicar a muchos otros ámbitos (por ejemplo, al cambio de comportamientos que necesitamos para la transición energética). Su conclusión es que los programas que funcionan son los que cambian restricciones, no los que cambian preferencias:
To be clear, I am not arguing that it’s easy to change behavior by changing constraints or fiddling with incentive design — assumptions may be false, theories may be wrong, consequences may be unintended. Nor is it easy to test such theories — file drawers, small sample sizes, motivated reasoning, forking paths and so on apply to all such tests. Nor am I saying that changing preferences is impossible. Propaganda and marketing change preferences, although in both cases it’s much easier to convince people that a particular brand satisfies preexisting preferences than to create entirely new preferences. I am saying that it’s decidedly tough to change preferences and that many criminology and social science programs aim to change preferences. Given this foundation, it’s hardly surprising that many RCTs fail. The criminological programs that RCTs test are typically inspired more by compelling narratives than solid theory and cognate evidence. Human beings are great storytellers — but most of the stories we tell are false. Acknowledging this could significantly change how we choose which programs to fund and test.
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