Muy interesante entrevista de Russ Roberts a Patrick House. Russ quería hablar más del libro, pero la cosa fue derivando...
Aprovecho para desear a todos los lectores una muy feliz Navidad. Hoy nos vamos de vacaciones en la universidad, así que como otros años, hasta después de fin de año sólo bloguearé si veo algo que valga la pena.
Siempre viene bien leer a Liebreich para pinchar unas cuantas burbujas (de H2, en este caso). Su conclusión:
The only way to move hydrogen economically is as a gas, by pipeline. Forget liquid hydrogen: it will struggle to find any role in the future energy or transport systems because of its poor volumetric energy density and difficulties with handling. It will have no role at all as a traded commodity.
Ammonia will be traded and transported, primarily for use in fertilizer production, plus as a shipping fuel. It will not be imported to power bulk power generation, but will be imported and stored to deliver long-duration storage. Some LOHC might also be imported, but only where it is stored for resilience purposes.
Clean methanol will be made near to sources of cheap clean hydrogen and some of it will be shipped around the world for use as a chemical feedstock. E-fuels – whether methanol, petrol, diesel or kerosene equivalents – will not be shipped around the world in meaningful volumes because their cost will severely limit their uptake, with the possible exception of aviation.
Totting up the various future hydrogen trade flows covered here, it is clear that the Hydrogen Council/McKinsey figures of 660 million tonnes of clean hydrogen production and 400 million tonnes of long-distance transportation are out by a factor of at least three. In addition, given that China and India have only pledged net zero by 2060 and 2070 respectively, such flows that do materialize will take decades beyond 2050.
The implications reach far beyond the question of international trade in hydrogen and its derivatives. The prohibitive cost of long-distance imports means that energy-intensive industries will inevitably migrate to regions with cheap clean energy. It is inconceivable for any country to import iron ore from Australia or Brazil, hydrogen from Australia, the Gulf, Canada or Africa, and make steel at a globally competitive cost. Magical thinking will be no defense against de-industrialization.
Finally, it is worth noting that none of this calls into question the fact that clean hydrogen will be required to decarbonize certain sectors, which will eventually create more than 100 million tonnes per year of demand. Just as railway mania left the world with railways, electricity mania left the world with power networks, and the dot-com bubble left the world with broadband fiber, so hydrogen mania will leave the world with a lot of clean hydrogen.
The worry is that, along the way, we are going to waste huge amounts of money on the wrong use cases for hydrogen and the wrong infrastructure in the wrong places. Worse than wasting money, we will also be wasting time – and that is the one thing we don’t have. Let’s be smart.
No hacía falta mucho para convencernos del error que supone publicar en editoriales malas, por mucho que estén bien colocadas en los rankings, pero estos datos nos lo confirman. Es el problema de aplicar sistemas de evaluación no cualitativos sin pensar mucho, y de no tener que defender tu investigación fuera de estos sistemas "tontos". Como siempre les digo a los doctorandos, a ver cuál de ellos encuentra trabajo con todas las publicaciones de su tesis en Energies, Sustainability, Frontiers...yo desde luego nunca les ficharía.
Y digo que desgraciadamente porque la propuesta negociada no resuelve ninguno de los grandes problemas. Es cierto que ahora incluye algún producto elaborado, pero sigue sin resolver la cuestión de las exportaciones, ni las emisiones indirectas de forma general, ni la retirada de la asignación gratuita. De hecho, me preocupa bastante este párrafo:
Any companies importing these into the EU will have to buy certificates to cover the carbon emissions embedded in them unless they can prove they have already been accounted for by climate legislation in the producer country.
No se dice nada de un precio del CO2. ¿Habrán aceptado cualquier legislación, tal como pedían los estadounidenses?
Mucho me temo que esto se va a quedar como un juguete para experimentar, pero que proteger, va a proteger poco (y por tanto habrá que ver qué pasa con la asignación gratuita).
ADD: Los agricultores y la industria de fertilizantes tampoco están contentos.
ADD2: Tyler Cowen tampoco cree que sea una buena solución...pero por las razones incorrectas. Creo que su análisis es bastante simplista, y no demasiado correcto.
Esade EcPol ha hecho las cuentas: por ahora sólo se han concedido aproximadamente un 20% de lo convocado para beneficiarios finales. La buena noticia es que se acelera el ritmo.
Siempre mola leer a Lightman. Habrá que estar atento a esa serie que comienza en Enero del 23...
Una estupenda lectura para todos aquellos preocupados por la descarbonización del transporte. David Metz repasa la evidencia y los mitos alrededor del transporte, y pone toda su experiencia y sabiduría en las propuestas. Que pasan, fundamentalmente, por reducir la demanda de movilidad (fundamentalmente con buen urbanismo).
Porque como analista sensato que es, David no cree que la electrificación sea la solución a todos los problemas. Tampoco cree que vaya a ser la ciudad de los quince minutos (que considera imposible de lograr). A este respecto, recuerda un dicho: todos vivimos en dos ciudades de quince minutos, en la que tenemos nuestra casa y en la que tenemos nuestro trabajo; y lo complicado es juntarlas.
También nos recuerda varias cuestiones difíciles de discutir:
- que el tiempo de desplazamiento diario se mantiene estable desde hace mucho tiempo: cuando creamos un sistema más eficiente, nos vamos más lejos...
- igual que cuando construimos una nueva infraestructura la congestionamos inmediatamente. La congestión tiene un equilibrio al que volvemos inevitablemente, da igual si añadimos o quitamos capacidad. La única solución es usar cargos por congestión, con sus problemas consiguientes de aceptabilidad. Eso, o limitar el aparcamiento (o aumentar mucho su coste).
- invertir en trenes sí permite reducir congestión. El problema es que los costes de capital son difícilmente recuperables con las tarifas.
- los coches, al circular a mayor velocidad (que una bici, por ejemplo) nos dan acceso a muchas más opciones. Esta es la principal razón de su popularidad.
- el coche eléctrico reduce emisiones, pero ningún otro problema; el coche autónomo parece difícil de conseguir con un nivel de seguridad suficiente, a un coste asumible; ni esto, ni la digitalización, cambiará la velocidad de transporte, y por lo tanto sólo mejorará la calidad (quizá marginalmente la integración de transportes públicos pueda aumentar su cuota).
- las bicis no sacan a la gente de sus coches, sino del transporte público.
En fin, una dosis de realismo muy bienvenida a este debate a veces un tanto idealizado.
Sam Raimi habla con Emily Grubert sobre la "mid-transition" y los desajustes que tendrán lugar a medida que progresemos. Nada nuevo para muchos de los lectores, pero no está mal el recordatorio. Aquí está el paper de Emily.
Buen diagnóstico de la situación. El reto es arreglarlo, y esto no es sencillo.
De mi buzón de correo:
European policy makers are facing the triple challenge of climate change, the war-related energy price hikes, and the relocation incentives from the US focused incentives from the inflation reduction act. Will the crisis create the political pressure necessary for joint-up and clear response? Our research points to four key elements that should be considered: an EU-wide response to the gas price crisis, a refinement of the CBAM design for an effective investment framework; contracts for difference to deploy renewables at scale; and climate alliances to ensure effective global cooperation.
An effective EU scale response to the gas price crisis.
The German Expert Commission on Gas and Heat has suggested to protect consumers for 70-80% of their gas consumption in the previous years against wholesale price increases above 70 Euro/MWh. In light of the current crisis, two recommendations warrant particular attention:
First: Additional programs and measures are necessary to inform, engage, enable and support households, public and private organizations and business to realize the necessary savings.
Allow me to invite you to a Berlin Seminar next Tuesday at 12.30 to discuss the implementation of these measures with members of the expert commission and the German government at DIW Berlin. If you want to join us for the event, please register at: https://www.diw.de/de/diw_01.c.860593.de/formulare/berlin_seminar_on_energy_and_climate_policy__bsec__dezember_2022__-_registrierung.html
Second: The implementation of a gas price limit at the national level that preserves incentives to save gas can serve as a blueprint for an EU-wide solution to a gas price limit opposed by countries like Germany and The Netherlands. 18 European economists outline a policy package that combines a price limit – preserving incentives – using regulation rather subsidies – with firm gas saving targets at member states. See https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/european-economists-eu-level-gas-price-cap-and-gas-saving-targets
This would save hundreds of billions of Euros in subsidies for investments into our future, avoids negative impacts on consumers in all EU countries and in developing countries importing LNG, and avoids delays and uncertainties from state aid clearance processes. See https://justclimate.fes.de/e/price-cap-energy-crisis
Carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)
The EU proposal for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) helped to create global attention for climate action. Yet, as the proposed design fails to address exports and the value chain, carbon leakage risks are only partially addressed. Hence the eternal debate continues – at what scale is it necessary to continue to grant free allowances. The result – persistent uncertainty, lack of effective carbon price incentives, and insufficient revenues from carbon pricing to compete with the scale of the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA).
As the analysis of the climate friendly materials platform and the support study commissioned by DG TAXUD show an alternative design of the CBAM using a climate contribution to complement EU ETS can create the desired carbon pricing incentives and revenues. By using standardized values both administrative feasibility and WTO compatibility are ensured. This CBAM design had initially been disregarded, because the standardized values fails to incentivize third countries to implement carbon pricing and emission reductions. However, if sectoral and climate alliances are used to advance such international cooperation, it may be a good idea to consider a refined CBAM design using a climate contribution in the current negotiations between EU member states and Parliament. See: https://climatestrategies.org/publication/addressing-export-concerns-in-the-cbam-file/
An ETS and CBAM design based on a climate contribution would also yield some additional 40 billion carbon revenue per year – available for domestic and international climate action. This would ensure that not only countries with fiscal leeway like Germany, Netherlands, France and Sweden can use carbon contracts for difference programs to support green investments, notably in basic materials, and modernize their industry, but all EU member states and possibly even international partners. See: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2022.104700
Contracts for difference to deploy renewables at scale
A functioning market environment and investment framework is essential to unlock the wind- and solar energy potential across the EU. The EU Commission indicates that contracts for differences and locational pricing should be explored. Both elements will be essential to protect investors against regulatory risk and energy users against financial risks of power purchase agreements, as well as future-proof the electricity market for a world of decentral flexibility resources such as electric vehicles, demand response and batteries. Already by 2030, CfDs will lower financing costs for renewable energy deployment, thus reducing energy costs for industry and households to the tune of 8 billion per year while enhancing protection against price hikes. In addition, an appropriate CfD-design can both set the right incentives for system friendliness, as well as reduce windfall profits of firms at good locations and will reduce financing costs.
The bigger picture: https://www.diw.de/de/diw_01.c.851297.de/publikationen/wochenberichte/2022_35_1/differenzvertraege_foerdern_den_ausbau_erneuerbarer_energien_und_mindern_strompreisrisiken.html
Auction design for Cfds: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4178053
Financing costs analysis: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0928765522000471
International perspective
Finally, Europe will need to continue to build on cooperation beyond its borders. It is a combination of fair and predictable rules, funding motivated by solidarity and mutual benefits of cooperation and an attractive shared vision that have determined the success of the European Union as well as its latest grand project, the EU Green Deal. Globally, it is likely to do so also when it comes to cooperating with emerging economies and developing countries on the green transition.
These nations will sign off on a joint climate and industrial policy if built on a robust institutional framework. A Climate Alliance can then reward ambitious action at home by sharing in financial flows; break through alliances can transform select sectors such as steel or cement; and energy transition partnerships can set out joint areas of technology cooperation. To this end, EU policy frameworks need to be aligned with the needs of such global cooperation. The EU ETS reform building on a climate contribution can also ensure sufficient scale and predictable funding to back up global climate alliances and partnerships, including for industrial transition.
Bridges over troubled waters: Climate clubs, alliances, and partnerships as safeguards for effective international cooperation? http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4246329
Carbon contracts for difference as an instrument for strengthening climate cooperation between industrialized and emerging economies https://doi.org/10.18723/diw_dwr:2022-38-1
Global Climate Alliance for Accelerated Climate Action https://www.kas.de/documents/272317/12679622/GCA+HandBook_Web.pdf/ff05462d-2d85-c91c-4ec3-d5acb4855eba?t=1669195207841
Outlook
Past crisis have shown that they can create the political momentum to trigger change with lasting benefits. Europe has the opportunity of this crisis to make decisive steps on key policy areas outlined above – to get on the right path for the domestic energy transition and global rules-based climate cooperation. Thus, rather than pushing for a global green race that is exclusive and targeted at industrial re-shoring, it will provide a robust and credible investment framework to mobilizing public and private funds to cope with the crisis.
Ya tienen unas guidelines preparadas, de hecho. Por si alguien quiere saber más de Contratos por diferencia de carbono, aquí está la guía que hicimos hace poco para los Verdes.
Quizá la barrera más grande al reciclado eficiente del plástico está en la necesidad de separar por tipos. Ahora al menos parece que se ha encontrado una forma de tratar conjuntamente el polietileno y el polipropileno. Ojalá esto avance más aún para ayudarnos a reducir emisiones y residuos indeseados.
Buena conversación para escuchar el fin de semana entre Steve Levitt y Annie Duke acerca de cuando es mejor renunciar, y de la combinación adecuada entre la perseverancia (grit) y la renuncia (quit). El mensaje en todo caso no es nuevo, ya la sabiduría popular nos lo cuenta siempre, que hay que saber renunciar a tiempo (una retirada a tiempo es una victoria, según Napoleón...) y no dejar que esa renuncia te persiga.
El martes tuve el placer de participar en una jornada en Málaga con ponentes de excepción del BBVA, de FUNCAS, de la AIREF...que analizaron la situación de la economía española en el marco actual. Muchísimas gracias a Victorio Valle y Antonio Pascual por invitarme y poder compartir unas ponencias muy interesantes, y una comida igual de entretenida.
Todas las ponencias fueron muy interesantes, como el análisis de descomposición de los drivers del crecimiento del PIB que presentó Felisa Becerra, o el impacto distributivo de las medidas del Gobierno (ya públicos desde el mes pasado, pero no por eso menos apabullantes) que ha realizado la AIREF. En el gráfico 4 R3 del informe enlazado puede observarse cómo todas las medidas que no apoyan directamente rentas son regresivas en términos de distribución de la ayuda, y que incluso cuando se suman las medidas de apoyo (gráfico 6 R3) como el bono térmico o eléctrico, el total sigue siendo regresivo. Pues eso.
